IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Long-standing territorial disputes in the Atacama Desert led to an outbreak of
hostilities in 1879 which pitted Chile against the combined forces of Bolivia and
Peru.1 The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) was the result of ongoing competition for
economic and political hegemony on the Pacific Coast of South America, a rivalry
complicated by a deep antipathy between Chile and Peru. In this milieu, the
vagueness of the boundaries between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, coupled with the
discovery of valuable guano and nitrate deposits in the disputed territories, combined
to produce a diplomatic conundrum of insurmountable proportions.2 Contentious
issues remained between Chile and Peru even after they concluded the Tacna and
Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol in 1929 and were only resolved seven decades
later in December 1999. While Bolivia was not a party to the 1999 Acta de
Execución and thus is not included in the title of this article, the resolution of
Bolivia's long-time quest for improved access to the Pacific Ocean remains at the
centre of a comprehensive solution to all of the diplomatic, economic and political
issues stemming from the War of the Pacific.
After four trying years of conflict, the Treaty of Ancón, concluded by Chile and Peru
in October 1883, re-established peace along the west coast of South America. Nine
of the fourteen articles which made up the agreement referred to either guano or
nitrates thus witnessing the central role economic interests played in the dispute. The
Peruvian government in Article 2 ceded to Chile unconditionally and in perpetuity
the littoral province of Tarapacá, the location of most of the valuable nitrate
holdings. In addition, Chile and Peru in Article 3 agreed to Chilean occupation of the
Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica for ten years after which time a plebiscite
would be held to determine their permanent ownership.3
Unfortunately, the terms of the proposed plebiscite were not detailed in the
agreement, an omission which contributed to abortive attempts, over a period of four
decades, to conduct a plebiscite in the occupied Peruvian provinces of Tacna and
Arica. Eventually, Chile and Peru in January 1923 agreed to an arbitration of the
question arising out of the unfulfilled provisions of Article 3 of the 1929 treaty by the
President of the United States. To the surprise of many observers, given the
documented Chileanisation of the territory which took place after 1883, President
Calvin Coolidge ruled in March 1925 that a fair and honest plebiscite could be held
in Tacna and Arica. Nevertheless, the subsequent efforts of two distinguished United
States army officers, General John J. Pershing and General William Lassiter, failed
to establish the necessary conditions for such a plebiscite, and efforts to conduct the
plebiscite were later abandoned in June 1926.4
The terms of the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, which greatly benefited Chile, were widely
condemned in Bolivia and Peru. The victor took as spoils the single most important
source of Bolivian and Peruvian wealth, the mineral rich Atacama Desert, along with
Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean. In the case of Bolivia, Chilean acquisition in
the pact of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá, which was north of the former
Bolivian littoral, also appeared to effectively preclude Bolivia from ever regaining its
littoral. Chile could hardly be expected to give Bolivia territory which would
separate Tarapacá from the remainder of Chile.
Bolivia and Chile concluded a formal truce agreement on 4 April 1884, which
provided for Chilean occupation of the Bolivian littoral pending conclusion of a
CHILE, PERU AND THE TREATY OF 1929:
THE FINAL SETTLEMENT
Ronald Bruce St John
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The resolution of
Bolivia's long-time
quest for improved
access to the Pacific
Ocean remains at
the centre of a
comprehensive
solution to all of the
diplomatic,
economic and
political issues
stemming from the
War of the Pacific.
92 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
treaty of peace. The pact also provided for the mutual return of sequestered Bolivian
and Chilean property, and Bolivia agreed to pay Chile an indemnity for war-related
damages.5 Representatives of Bolivia and Chile later concluded a treaty of peace,
friendship, and commerce in October 1904. In this agreement, Bolivia ceded to Chile
in perpetuity the former Bolivian littoral, including the ports of Mejillones, Cobija,
Tocopilla, and Antofagasta. In return, the Chilean government guaranteed Bolivia
commercial transit rights through Chile together with facilities at selected ports,
notably the occupied Peruvian port of Arica. It should be noted at this point that
Bolivia had expressed interest in Arica as a Bolivian port as early as the 1820s and
offered to buy it in 1841. Chile also agreed in the 1904 pact to pay Bolivia 300,000
pounds sterling and promised to build a railroad from the port of Arica to La Paz.6
Improved Bolivian links to the sea through Chile proper and Chilean-occupied
territory, as accorded in the 1904 treaty, appeared at the outset of the twentieth
century to be undermining Bolivia's claim to be without adequate outlets to the
Pacific Ocean (Figure 1).
Following lengthy negotiations, Chile and Peru eventually followed up the 1883
Treaty of Ancón with the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol. In
this agreement, the signatories in Article 2 divided ownership of the former Peruvian
provinces of Tacna and Arica with Tacna going to Peru and Arica going to Chile. In
turn, Chile ceded to Peru "all its rights on the Uchusuma and Mauri Canals" without
prejudice to the sovereignty which Chile would be able to exercise over the portion
of said aqueducts remaining in Chilean territory. For both canals, Chile constituted
"on the portion crossing its territory the fullest right of way in perpetuity in favor of
Peru." In addition, Chile agreed in Article 5 to construct for Peru a wharf, customs
office, and railway station at Arica "in which establishments and zones, [the] transit
commerce of Peru will enjoy independence pertaining to a free port of the greatest
amplitude." In Article 7, Chile and Peru agreed to respect "private rights legally
acquired in the territories remaining under their respective sovereignties"
specifically mentioning the Tacna to Arica Railway Company which was to become
the property of Peru at the end of a 99-year contract concluded in 1852 but effective
from 1857: "Without detriment to the sovereignty it is entitled to exercise, Chile
grants in perpetuity, in the portion of its territory crossed by the line, the most
extensive right of way in favor of Peru." The terms of the 1852 contract were
noteworthy because they constituted a servitude over both the property of the Tacna-
Arica Railway Company and the land on which it was built. The signatories also
agreed in Article 11 to build a monument on the Morro of Arica to commemorate
their improvement in diplomatic relations.7
The additional protocol to the 1929 treaty contained a number of significant provisos
including Article 1 which stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru could cede to a third
state any of the territories over which they were granted sovereignty in the treaty
without the prior agreement of the other signatory. The same article also stipulated
that neither signatory could build new international railway lines across those same
territories without the approval of the other. Article 3 of the additional protocol
referenced Article 5 of the treaty indicating that the port facilities which Chile was to
build for Peru were to enjoy "the most absolute free transit to person, merchandise
and armaments to Peruvian territory and from this across Chilean territory."
Throughout the bilateral negotiations between Chile and Peru over the Tacna-Arica
question, the Bolivian government lobbied intensely but unsuccessfully for a
tripartite agreement which would address its desire for a sovereign Pacific port. In
the aftermath of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol, Bolivia continued to
articulate a need for improved access to the Pacific Ocean. Following a confusing
episode in 1936, in which Bolivian elements reportedly agreed to back parties
seeking to overthrow the Peruvian government in return for support in making Arica
a Bolivian port, Bolivia and Peru concluded a nonaggression pact which prohibited
TACNA AND ARICA
SETTLEMENT
The additional protocol
to the 1929 treaty
contained a number of
significant provisos…
Articles Section 93
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Figure 1
94 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Figure 2
intervention in the internal or external affairs of the signatories. The Bolivian
government also declared in the 1936 treaty that it had no political or territorial
problems with Peru which seemed to end any Bolivian aspirations for a seaport at
Peruvian expense.8
The Bolivian government in June 1950 again attempted to revive the issue when it
proposed to Chile direct negotiations aimed at granting Bolivia a sovereign exit to
the Pacific. While Chile agreed to discuss the issue, its response to Bolivia raised the
question of compensation and emphasised that under the terms of the 1929 treaty it
was obliged to consult with Peru. Negotiations made little progress after this initial
exchange of ideas. Bolivians opposed a Chilean scheme suggesting that
compensation for a Pacific port should take the form of water from the Bolivian
altiplano. The Peruvian government was also opposed to the Chilean suggestion that
the waters of Lake Titicaca be used to compensate Chile for a Bolivian port. Peru had
long considered those waters held in condominium by Bolivia and Peru for their
exclusive use. Two decades later, Bolivia and Chile engaged in secret talks in 1971
which were reportedly on the verge of resolving the issue when the Bolivian
government was overthrown and negotiations broke down.9
In early 1975, the governments of Bolivia and Chile re-established diplomatic
relations, ties which were severed in 1962 when Chile moved unilaterally to divert
the headwaters of the Lauca River.10 Bolivia then requested in August 1975 a
sovereign coastline at Arica together with a land corridor 50km long by 15km wide
further south. Chile responded with a counterproposal in December 1975 in which it
offered to exchange a land-sea corridor north of Arica along the Peruvian border
extending to the 200 nautical sea limit in return for equivalent territorial
compensation in the Bolivian altiplano (Figure 2). While Bolivia initially accepted
the concept of equivalent territorial exchange, it later rejected the Chilean proposal
Chile offered to
exchange a land-sea
corridor north of Arica
along the Peruvian
border for equivalent
territorial
compensation in the
Bolivian altiplano.
Articles Section 95
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Figure 3
arguing that it should not have to make territorial concessions to obtain land seized in
an aggressive war.11
When Peru learned from Chile, through the formal consultations called for in the
1929 agreements, that the Bolivia-Chile talks centred on territory that was once
Peruvian, the Peruvian government prepared a counterproposal in November 1976
which introduced a new tripartite formula and effectively undercut the Chilean
initiative. Peru proposed creation of a zone of joint Bolivia-Chile-Peru sovereignty
between the city of Arica and the Peruvian border with Bolivia receiving a corridor
feeding into this zone.12 Offering Bolivia as much as the Chilean proposal, the
Peruvian initiative also reintroduced the issue of Peruvian rights in the disputed zone.
Calling for trilateral economic development of the territory, the Peruvian approach
reflected a renewed emphasis by the Francisco Morales Bermúdez administration on
Andean cooperation and integration (Figure 3).13 The Peruvian initiative contributed
to the failure of this round of negotiations as the Chilean government immediately
rejected it on the grounds the proposal introduced issues unrelated to the question at
hand, infringed on Chilean sovereignty, and threatened modifications to the 1929
treaty.14
In the closing days of 1976, both Chile and Peru reaffirmed their commitment to a
satisfactory arrangement for Bolivia with each side blaming the other for the
stalemate in negotiations. Eventually, Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez served
formal notice of the impasse on Christmas day 1976 when he rejected in principle
Chilean demands for territorial compensation as well as the Peruvian proposal for
trilateral occupation. Even though little real progress towards resolving outstanding
issues was made in this round of talks, they were noteworthy because in them Bolivia
received formal recognition from both Chile and Peru of its right to coastal territory
although the content of their most recent proposals varied widely. After another
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IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
frustrating year of unproductive attempts to reach a settlement, the Bolivian
government again broke diplomatic relations with Chile in March 1978.15
In the latter half of the 1980s, the Peruvian government of Alan García Pérez
explored the issue in conjunction with regional diplomatic initiatives intended to
improve relations with Peru's neighbours. Soon after the García administration took
office, the Foreign Minister of Peru travelled to La Paz where discussions centred on
improved commercial relations together with joint efforts to control the illicit
narcotics trade known as narcotráfico throughout Latin America. Peruvian
representatives at the time acknowledged Bolivia's ongoing concern for sovereign
access to the sea but emphasised that it was largely a bilateral issue between Bolivia
and Chile. The Bolivian government in the same time frame also moved away from
the largely multilateral strategy it had been pursuing for decades and in the direction
of a bilateral solution. For example, Bolivia at one point offered to buy outright from
Chile a ten-mile strip of territory north of Arica along the Peruvian frontier, an
approach which met with no enthusiasm in Santiago. Peruvian President García later
appeared to reverse long-standing Peruvian policy when he indicated to his Bolivian
counterpart that the Peruvian government was prepared to accept Chilean cession to
Bolivia of land occupied by Chile after the War of the Pacific. However, the Bolivian
government of Jaime Paz Zamora was unable to take advantage of this app.arent
policy shift before Alberto Fujimori replaced García as president of Peru in the
summer of 1990.16
The governments of Bolivia and Peru later negotiated a 50-year renewable agreement
in early 1992 which permitted Bolivia to establish shipping and customs operations
in a duty-free zone and industrial park in the Peruvian port of Ilo, approximately
1,260km south of Lima and 460km west of La Paz. Peru also ceded to Bolivia in the
agreement a tourist zone for 99 years, together with 5km of Ilo coastline. The
Bolivians immediately baptised the coastal strip ‘Bolivia Mar’. In return, Bolivia
ceded similar facilities to Peru at Puerto Suarez on the Paraguay River at the border
with Brazil as a site to promote Peruvian trade with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
While the signatories to the agreement both hailed it as an historic step which would
greatly facilitate regional development, the Bolivian government emphasised that the
pact with Peru marked only the first step in its determination to recover its full rights
to the sea. The Peruvian government sounded a more pragmatic note emphasising the
need to respect existing international agreements while seeking creative solutions to
difficult problems.17
Even as Peru negotiated with Bolivia, it continued its dialogue with Chile aimed at
full implementation of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol. Talks here focused on
three separate but related articles in the 1929 agreements. To summarise, Article 5 of
the treaty called for Chile to construct at Arica for Peru a wharf, customs office, and
a terminal station for the Tacna-Arica railway. Article 7 of the treaty called for Chile
and Peru to respect private rights legally acquired in the territories remaining under
their respective sovereignties, including the right of Peru to the Tacna-Arica Railway
Company. Article 2 of the additional protocol called for Peru to enjoy complete
freedom of transit for persons, merchandise, and armaments to and from Peruvian
territory once the port facilities called for in Article 5 had been constructed. Although
Chile had agreed in a convention negotiated in the mid-1980s to turn over a dock in
Arica it had constructed for Peru, as well as granting to Peru the right to use the
Tacna-Arica railway, the question of complete freedom of transit on the railway to
the pier remained contentious. Peruvian authorities at the outset of President
Fujimori's first term continued to argue that the terms of the 1929 agreements had
still not been honoured in full.18
Formal negotiations with Chile opened in early 1993 and initially appeared fruitful.
Representatives of Chile and Peru concluded an agreement in May 1993, often
BILATERAL
TALKS
The Bolivian
government also
moved away from
the largely
multilateral strategy
it had been pursuing
for decades and in
the direction of a
bilateral solution.
Articles Section 97
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
referred to as the Lima Conventions, which seemed to resolve the final disagreements
affecting full implementation of the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional
Protocol. Unfortunately, appearances once again proved deceptive. Less than two
years later, Peruvian Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela and his Chilean counterpart,
José María Insulza, announced that the 1993 Lima Conventions were being set aside
since they were no longer appropriate to negotiations between Chile and Peru.
Instead, the parties agreed to seek what was described as a "practical and concrete
formula" related to the facilities provided for in the 1929 agreements. Over the next
four years, little progress was made on this issue as Peru was preoccupied with its
border dispute with Ecuador; however, observers agreed that full implementation of
the terms of the 1929 agreements remained high on the foreign policy agendas of
both Chile and Peru.19
The governments of Ecuador and Peru, on 28 October 1998, concluded a Global and
Definitive Peace Agreement that ended the longest standing boundary dispute in the
Americas.20 In the wake of the successful conclusion of this emotionally charged,
highly involved dispute, the Peruvian government announced its desire to resolve
with Chile all outstanding issues relating to the 1929 treaty and additional protocol.
Following almost a year of often tough negotiations, Foreign Ministers Fernando de
Trazegnies of Peru and Juan Gabriel Valdés of Chile, in the ornate Salón Dorado de
Palacio de Gobierno in Lima, signed on 13 November 1999 a package of documents
which collectively executed the 1929 treaty and additional protocol and ended 70
years of controversy. At the same time, Chile returned to Peru some 200 books and
documents, mostly pertaining to the city of Tacna, which had been taken to Chile at
the end of the War of the Pacific.21
The Act of Execution (Acta de Ejecución) specifically addressed the requirement in
Article 5 of the 1929 treaty for Chile to construct for Peru a wharf, customs office,
and a railway terminal station at Arica as well as the requirement in Article 2 of the
additional protocol which called for absolute free transit of persons, merchandise,
and armaments to and from Peruvian territory. Additionally, it recognised the right of
servitude, as detailed in Article 5 of the treaty, including its application to the Arica
and Tacna Railway Company where it crosses Chilean territory. Finally, the
executing act detailed the Peruvian administrative bodies with future authority in
Arica, specifically the Empresa Nacional de Puertos S.A. (ENAPU) for the port, the
Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (ENAFER) for the railway, and the Aduana del
Perú for customs. The Regulation of the Act of Execution (Reglamento del Acta de
Ejecución) provided additional details at the operative level of the agreement. The
Interinstitutional Act (Acuerdo Interinstitucional sobre Solución de Controversias),
in turn, addressed potential areas of future conflict or controversy in the
administration of the total agreement (Figure 4).
The resolution of the outstanding issues related to the 1929 treaty and additional
protocol was generally well received in both Chile and Peru. The most obvious
exception was a determined group of patriots, mostly resident in and around the
Peruvian city of Tacna, who argued that the details of the settlement were
unfavourable to Peru. Concern was also expressed that the agreement did not include
provision for investment in the frontier region with Chile similar to the US$3 billion
investment package which was an integral part of the 1998 Ecuador-Peru boundary
settlement. Peruvian flags in Tacna, many adorned with black ribbons, flew at halfmast
for days and the Pan-American highway from Tacna to Arica was blocked in
protest for a short period of time. Criticism in Chile was centred in Arica where
residents were worried that the agreements would result in Bolivian cargo being
diverted to the Peruvian wharf and thus have a negative economic impact on Chilean
facilities. The Bolivian government, on the other hand, congratulated Chile and Peru
for concluding the executing act while at the same time expressing the hope that
attention could now turn towards satisfying Bolivian desires for a sovereign exit to
END GAME
A Global and
Definitive Peace
Agreement that ended
the longest standing
boundary dispute in
the Americas.
98 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Figure 4
The Promenade
PPaaccii ff iicc OOcceeaann
AARR II CCAA
N
the Pacific Ocean. Less than three weeks later, President Alberto Fujimori completed
the first official state visit of a Peruvian president to Chile. Chilean President
Eduardo Frei later visited Peru in early February 2000.22
The dispute between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru for control of the Atacama Desert has
changed considerably in character and content since its inception almost two
centuries ago. In the beginning, it was largely a boundary dispute not unlike the
myriad of other such issues pending throughout Latin America. The character of the
dispute began to change after 1842 when the discovery of guano, sodium nitrate, and
other minerals in the disputed zone raised serious issues of economic development as
well as regional hegemony. In the aftermath of the War of the Pacific, a victorious
Chile sought to consolidate its position in the region while Bolivia and Peru hoped to
regain both lost territories and national honour. Once Chile concluded peace treaties
with Peru in 1883 and Bolivia in 1904, regional and international trade and other
economic concerns often took a secondary position to geopolitical considerations in
the region.
The dispute was tripartite in nature from the beginning and remained so for most of
its long history. For Bolivia, any acceptable alternative to its Pacific port at Cobija
naturally involved, after 1842, the interests and rights of Chile and Peru. Once
Bolivia had declared war on Chile in 1879, Peru was honour bound under the terms
of an 1873 treaty of defensive alliance to join the conflict on the side of Bolivia.
After conclusion of the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, it took Chile and Peru more than four
decades to reach a final settlement. When they did, the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty
and Additional Protocol again mirrored the tripartite nature of the dispute in that the
additional protocol stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru could cede territory
obtained in the treaty to a third state without the permission of the other signatory.
OBSERVATIONS
The dispute was
tripartite in nature
from the beginning
and remained so for
most of its long
history.
Articles Section 99
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Over the next 70 years, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru engaged in numerous bilateral and
trilateral negotiations.23 The most positive result to date is the package of agreements
concluded by Chile and Peru in December 1999 which executes the unfulfilled
clauses of the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol. The 1999
agreements appear to be a good result for Chile and Peru; unfortunately, they do not
address the aspirations of Bolivia which continues to demand a Pacific port. In this
regard, the challenge and opportunity of the recent pacts between Chile and Peru is to
make them the genesis of a new spirit of negotiation and compromise which also
takes into full account the legitimate interests of Bolivia. Until a trinational accord or
alternative solution fully satisfactory to the governments of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru
is reached, it is difficult to envisage a future diplomatic or economic process which
truly maximises sub-regional cooperation and development.
Notes
1 For a detailed discussion of the origins of the dispute see St John, R. B. (1994) The
Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert, Boundary and Territory Briefing 1,
6, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit: 1-12.
2 Bonilla, H. (1994) Guano y Burguesía en el Perú, 3rd ed., Quito: Flacso-Sede
Ecuador: 127-167; Jarama, A. (1998) ‘El Perú y la cuestión portuaria boliviana en el
siglo XIX: Factores de inestabilidad’, Política Internacional (julio/setiembre): 127-
129.
3 Copies of the Treaty of Ancón and its Supplementary Protocol can be found in Peru,
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (1936) Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos
vigentes entre el Perú y otros estados I, Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre: 165-168.
4 Dennis, W. J. (1931) Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru Boundary
Dispute and of the Arbitrations by the United States, New Haven: Yale University
Press: 194-226; Palacios Rodríguez, R. (1974) La Chilenización de Tacna y Arica,
1883-1929, Lima: Editorial Arica S. A.; Yepes del Castillo, Ernesto (1999) "Un
plebiscito imposible..." Tacna-Arica, 1925-1926, Lima: Ediciones Análisis.
5 For a copy of the 1884 truce agreement see Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
y Colonización (1884) Memoria al congreso nacional de 1884, Santiago: n.p.: xxivxxviii.
6 Encina, F. A. (1963) Las relaciones entre Chile y Bolivia (1841-1963), Santiago:
Editorial Nascimento: 18-21. For a copy of the 1904 treaty see Dennis, W. J. (1927)
Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, Iowa City: University Press: 232-
234.
7 For a copy of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol see Peru (1936) Tratados,
convenciones y acuerdos: 183-187. An English language translation of the treaty and
additional protocol can be found in Dennis (1931) Tacna and Arica: 316-320. On the
Tacna-Arica Railway Company see Contrato de Construcción y Explotación del
Ferrocarril de Arica a la Ciudad de Tacna Celebrado entre el Gobierno Peruano y
Don José Hegan (1852) mimeograph.
8 St John (1994) Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute: 19; Gumucio Granier, J. (1997) ‘Alberto
Ostria y el Pacto con el Perú de 1936’, Agenda Internacional IV, 9 (julio-diciembre):
97-106.
9 Fernando Guachalla, L. (1976) La cuestión portuaria y las negociaciones de 1950, La
Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 34-104; Fellmann Velarde, J.
(1967) Memorandum sobre política exterior boliviana, 2d ed., La Paz: Librería
Editorial Juventud: 81-121 and 146-148; Gumucio Granier, J. (1985) Estados Unidos y
el Mar Boliviano: Testimonios para la historia, New York: n.p.: 537-541.
10 Gordon, D. R. (1979) ‘The Question of the Pacific: Current Perspectives on a Long-
Standing Dispute’, World Affairs 141, 4 (Spring): 324-325. For a detailed analysis of
the so-called Charaña negotiations which opened in 1975 see Gumucio Granier, J.
(1999) Charaña: Negociación Marítima, 1975-1978, mimeograph, especially Chapter
5.
11 Gorman, S. M. (1981) ‘Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and
Economic Initiatives’, in Ferris, E. G. and Lincoln, J. K. (eds.) Latin American
Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, Boulder: Westview Press: 122-
123; Pittman, H. T. (1984) ‘Chilean Foreign Policy: The Pragmatic Pursuit of
Dr Ronald Bruce St
John is an
independent scholar
specialising in the
political economy and
foreign policy of
developing states. He
first visited Bolivia,
Chile and Peru in 1968
and has been a
regular commentator
on Andean affairs
since that time.
100 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 ©
Geopolitical Goals’, in Lincoln, J. K. and Ferris, E. G. (eds.) The Dynamics of Latin
American Foreign Policies: Challenges for the 1980's, Boulder and London:
Westview Press: 133; Shumavon, D. H. (1981) ‘Bolivia: Salida al Mar’, in Ferris, E.
G. and Lincoln, J. K. (eds.) Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional
Dimensions, Boulder: Westview Press: 184-186.
12 Lagos Carmona, G. (1981) Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: Los tratados de límites
con Bolivia, 2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello: 130-131; De la Puente Radbill,
J. (1989) ‘La mediterraneidad de Bolivia’, in Ferrero Costa, E. (ed.) Relaciones del
Perú con Chile y Bolivia, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales: 45-53.
13 St John, R. B. (1992) Boundaries, Trade and Seaports: Power Politics in the Atacama
Desert, Program in Latin American Studies Occasional Paper Series, No. 28,
University of Massachusetts at Amherst: 28.
14 Escobari Cusicanqui, J. (1982) Historia diplomática de Bolivia, II, Lima: Talleres de
Industrial Gráfica, S. A.: 39-53; Lagos Carmona, G. (1981) Historia de las Fronteras
de Chile: Los tratados de límites con Bolivia, 2d ed., Santiago: Editorial AndrésBello:
126-132; Montenegro, W. (1987) Oportunidades Perdidas: Bolivia y el Mar, La Paz
and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 69-136.
15 Botelho Gosalvez, R. (1980) El litoral Boliviano: perspectiva histórica y geopolítica,
Buenos Aires: El Cid Editor: 143-144; Lagos Carmona, Historia de las Fronteras de
Chile: 132; Morales, W. Q. (1992) Bolivia: Land of Struggle, Boulder: Westview
Press: 177-178.
16 República de Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (1988) Tricolor:
Historia y Proyecciones de Paz, Desarrollo e Integración del Diferendo Marítimo
Boliviano-Chileno, La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 95-157;
Morales (1992) Bolivia: 179; Ferrero Costa, E. (1987) ‘Peruvian Foreign Policy:
Current Trends, Constraints and Opportunities’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs 29, 2 (Summer): 63-66.
17 St John, R. B. (1994) ‘Stalemate in the Atacama’, IBRU Boundary and Security
Bulletin 2, 1 (April): 66-67.
18 St John, R. B. (1999) La Política Exterior del Perú, Lima: Asociación de Funcionarios
del Servicio Diplomático del Perú: 220-221; Mercado Jarrín, E. (1988) ‘Las relaciones
actuales del Perú con Chile y Bolivia: Algunas reflexiones’, in Eduardo Ferrero Costa
(ed.) Relaciones del Perú con los paises vecinos, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios
Internacionales: 150-153; Brousset Barrios, J. (1989) ‘Ejecución de las cláusulas
pendientes del Tratado de 1929’, in Eduardo Ferrero Costa (ed.) Relaciones del Perú
con Chile y Bolivia, Lima: Centro de Estudios Internacionales: 97-109.
19 Tudela, F. (1998-1999) ‘Entrevista a Francisco Tudela’, Debate XX, 104 (diciembre -
enero):15-16; ‘Chile dice que no se cambiarán términos de la Convención de Lima’, El
Comercio (Lima), February 13, 1995; 'Lima Conventions Set Aside', IBRU Boundary
and Security Bulletin 4, 2 (Summer 1996): 54-55; St John, ‘Stalemate in the Atacama’,
67-68.
20 For a detailed discussion of the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute see St John, R. B.
(1999) The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to Settlement, Boundary and
Territory Briefing, 3, 1, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit.
21 Acta de Ejecución (13 November 1999), Reglamento del Acto de Ejecución (13
November 1999), Acuerdo Interinstitucional sobre Solución de Controversias (13
November 1999), mimeograph copies. Peruvian Foreign Minister Fernando de
Trazegnies, a dedicated bibliophile, took real satisfaction in the return of this cache of
historical materials to Peru.
22 Deustua C., A. (1999) ‘Amaos Los Unos y los Rotos’, Caretas 1595 (25 de
Noviembre); El Comercio (Lima) 13 November 1999 and 14 November 1999; La
República (Lima) 14 November 1999 and 24 November 1999; El Diario (La Paz) 12
November 1999 and 13 November 1999; El Mercurio (Santiago) 12 November 1999.
23 For a recent discussion of alternative solutions to the dispute see Barrios, R. (ed.)
(1997) Bolivia, Chile Y Perú: Una opción cooperativa, La Paz: Unidad de Análisis de
Política Exterior, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.
El respaldo de la ministra de la Producción, Gladys Triveño, al Decreto Supremo 005-2012 hace que nuestro país pierda divisas, impuestos y empleo y favorezca a Chile con la pesca de anchoveta, en detrimento del sur peruano, denunció el armador pesquero Roberto Vieira.
Indicó que Perú tiene dos biomasas de anchoveta científicamente comprobadas, una que va del centro hacia el norte de nuestro país y la otra en la zona sur, que compartimos con el norte de Chile.
“La anchoveta está dentro de las cinco millas desde Arequipa, Moquegua, Tacna y se traslada en grandes volúmenes hacia Chile, pasando por Arica, Tarapacá y Antofagasta. En otras palabras, lo que Perú deja de pescar en el sur lo pescan los chilenos”, acotó.
En ese sentido, cuestionó que mientras Chile permite que tanto su flota industrial como artesanal del norte pesquen dentro de las cinco millas, “aquí se hace todo lo contrario gracias al Decreto Supremo 005-2012, que obliga a los artesanales de menor escala e industriales a pescar fuera de las cinco y diez millas, respectivamente, donde la anchoveta habita en cantidades mínimas en la zona sur peruana. De esta manera casi el 100% del recurso se va para Chile”.
“Por eso la industria pesquera nacional en ese sector está condenada a la quiebra total. Es imperativo que este decreto sea derogado”, añadió.
No se depreda
Refirió que en la zona sur del Perú el zócalo continental es profundo y hay grandes abismos submarinos desde la milla dos que no permiten depredación al pescar dentro de las cinco millas.
“Todo lo contrario a la zona centro y norte, donde se justifica que los barcos industriales no pesquen dentro de las cinco millas. Igual lo entienden las autoridades chilenas y por eso ellos permiten que tanto su flota artesanal e industrial, vía ventanas de perforación, pesquen dentro de las cinco millas en su zona norte, en la frontera con Tacna. Ellos están felices por la política de la ministra Triveño, ya que los está favoreciendo con cientos de millones de dólares que nuestra industria y artesanales de menor escala están dejando de ganar por el referido decreto”, aseveró.
Red mapochina
Vieira consideró que “es muy escandaloso lo que está pasando. Este daño no es casual, porque parece que estaría operando una red chilena en contra del sector pesquero nacional, poniendo trabas en la zona de frontera para aprovechar la anchoveta”.
“Además, coincide sospechosamente con la gran inversión que han hecho el año pasado por más de 100 millones de dólares en Arica para construir una planta de omega 3, que son ácidos grasos esenciales de cadena larga EPA y DHA que no pueden ser producidos por el cuerpo humano. Pueden consumirse al comer ciertos alimentos, predominantemente pescados y mariscos, pero especialmente pescado oleaginoso como la anchoveta y el salmón, que contienen unas de las concentraciones más altas de EPA y DHA, que tienen un papel importante en el desarrollo del cerebro y el sistema nervioso”, acotó
