LINEA DE LA CONCORDIA PERU-CHILE AND THE TREATY OF 1929: THE FINAL SETTLEMENT

IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Long-standing territorial disputes in the Atacama Desert led to an outbreak of hostilities in 1879 which pitted Chile against the combined forces of Bolivia and Peru.1 The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) was the result of ongoing competition for economic and political hegemony on the Pacific Coast of South America, a rivalry complicated by a deep antipathy between Chile and Peru. In this milieu, the vagueness of the boundaries between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, coupled with the discovery of valuable guano and nitrate deposits in the disputed territories, combined to produce a diplomatic conundrum of insurmountable proportions.2 Contentious issues remained between Chile and Peru even after they concluded the Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol in 1929 and were only resolved seven decades later in December 1999. While Bolivia was not a party to the 1999 Acta de Execución and thus is not included in the title of this article, the resolution of Bolivia's long-time quest for improved access to the Pacific Ocean remains at the centre of a comprehensive solution to all of the diplomatic, economic and political issues stemming from the War of the Pacific. After four trying years of conflict, the Treaty of Ancón, concluded by Chile and Peru in October 1883, re-established peace along the west coast of South America. Nine of the fourteen articles which made up the agreement referred to either guano or nitrates thus witnessing the central role economic interests played in the dispute. The Peruvian government in Article 2 ceded to Chile unconditionally and in perpetuity the littoral province of Tarapacá, the location of most of the valuable nitrate holdings. In addition, Chile and Peru in Article 3 agreed to Chilean occupation of the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica for ten years after which time a plebiscite would be held to determine their permanent ownership.3 Unfortunately, the terms of the proposed plebiscite were not detailed in the agreement, an omission which contributed to abortive attempts, over a period of four decades, to conduct a plebiscite in the occupied Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica. Eventually, Chile and Peru in January 1923 agreed to an arbitration of the question arising out of the unfulfilled provisions of Article 3 of the 1929 treaty by the President of the United States. To the surprise of many observers, given the documented Chileanisation of the territory which took place after 1883, President Calvin Coolidge ruled in March 1925 that a fair and honest plebiscite could be held in Tacna and Arica. Nevertheless, the subsequent efforts of two distinguished United States army officers, General John J. Pershing and General William Lassiter, failed to establish the necessary conditions for such a plebiscite, and efforts to conduct the plebiscite were later abandoned in June 1926.4 The terms of the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, which greatly benefited Chile, were widely condemned in Bolivia and Peru. The victor took as spoils the single most important source of Bolivian and Peruvian wealth, the mineral rich Atacama Desert, along with Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean. In the case of Bolivia, Chilean acquisition in the pact of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá, which was north of the former Bolivian littoral, also appeared to effectively preclude Bolivia from ever regaining its littoral. Chile could hardly be expected to give Bolivia territory which would separate Tarapacá from the remainder of Chile. Bolivia and Chile concluded a formal truce agreement on 4 April 1884, which provided for Chilean occupation of the Bolivian littoral pending conclusion of a CHILE, PERU AND THE TREATY OF 1929:

THE FINAL SETTLEMENT Ronald Bruce St John INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND The resolution of Bolivia's long-time quest for improved access to the Pacific Ocean remains at the centre of a comprehensive solution to all of the diplomatic, economic and political issues stemming from the War of the Pacific. 92 Articles Section IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © treaty of peace. The pact also provided for the mutual return of sequestered Bolivian and Chilean property, and Bolivia agreed to pay Chile an indemnity for war-related damages.5 Representatives of Bolivia and Chile later concluded a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce in October 1904. In this agreement, Bolivia ceded to Chile in perpetuity the former Bolivian littoral, including the ports of Mejillones, Cobija, Tocopilla, and Antofagasta. In return, the Chilean government guaranteed Bolivia commercial transit rights through Chile together with facilities at selected ports, notably the occupied Peruvian port of Arica. It should be noted at this point that Bolivia had expressed interest in Arica as a Bolivian port as early as the 1820s and offered to buy it in 1841. Chile also agreed in the 1904 pact to pay Bolivia 300,000 pounds sterling and promised to build a railroad from the port of Arica to La Paz.6 Improved Bolivian links to the sea through Chile proper and Chilean-occupied territory, as accorded in the 1904 treaty, appeared at the outset of the twentieth century to be undermining Bolivia's claim to be without adequate outlets to the Pacific Ocean (Figure 1).

Following lengthy negotiations, Chile and Peru eventually followed up the 1883 Treaty of Ancón with the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol. In this agreement, the signatories in Article 2 divided ownership of the former Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica with Tacna going to Peru and Arica going to Chile. In turn, Chile ceded to Peru "all its rights on the Uchusuma and Mauri Canals" without prejudice to the sovereignty which Chile would be able to exercise over the portion of said aqueducts remaining in Chilean territory. For both canals, Chile constituted "on the portion crossing its territory the fullest right of way in perpetuity in favor of Peru." In addition, Chile agreed in Article 5 to construct for Peru a wharf, customs office, and railway station at Arica "in which establishments and zones, [the] transit commerce of Peru will enjoy independence pertaining to a free port of the greatest amplitude." In Article 7, Chile and Peru agreed to respect "private rights legally acquired in the territories remaining under their respective sovereignties" specifically mentioning the Tacna to Arica Railway Company which was to become the property of Peru at the end of a 99-year contract concluded in 1852 but effective from 1857: "Without detriment to the sovereignty it is entitled to exercise, Chile grants in perpetuity, in the portion of its territory crossed by the line, the most extensive right of way in favor of Peru." The terms of the 1852 contract were noteworthy because they constituted a servitude over both the property of the Tacna- Arica Railway Company and the land on which it was built. The signatories also agreed in Article 11 to build a monument on the Morro of Arica to commemorate their improvement in diplomatic relations.7 The additional protocol to the 1929 treaty contained a number of significant provisos including Article 1 which stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru could cede to a third state any of the territories over which they were granted sovereignty in the treaty without the prior agreement of the other signatory. The same article also stipulated that neither signatory could build new international railway lines across those same territories without the approval of the other. Article 3 of the additional protocol referenced Article 5 of the treaty indicating that the port facilities which Chile was to build for Peru were to enjoy "the most absolute free transit to person, merchandise and armaments to Peruvian territory and from this across Chilean territory." Throughout the bilateral negotiations between Chile and Peru over the Tacna-Arica question, the Bolivian government lobbied intensely but unsuccessfully for a tripartite agreement which would address its desire for a sovereign Pacific port. In the aftermath of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol, Bolivia continued to articulate a need for improved access to the Pacific Ocean. Following a confusing episode in 1936, in which Bolivian elements reportedly agreed to back parties seeking to overthrow the Peruvian government in return for support in making Arica a Bolivian port, Bolivia and Peru concluded a nonaggression pact which prohibited TACNA AND ARICA SETTLEMENT The additional protocol to the 1929 treaty contained a number of significant provisos… Articles Section 93 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Figure 1 94 Articles Section IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Figure 2 intervention in the internal or external affairs of the signatories. The Bolivian government also declared in the 1936 treaty that it had no political or territorial problems with Peru which seemed to end any Bolivian aspirations for a seaport at Peruvian expense.8 The Bolivian government in June 1950 again attempted to revive the issue when it proposed to Chile direct negotiations aimed at granting Bolivia a sovereign exit to the Pacific. While Chile agreed to discuss the issue, its response to Bolivia raised the question of compensation and emphasised that under the terms of the 1929 treaty it was obliged to consult with Peru. Negotiations made little progress after this initial exchange of ideas. Bolivians opposed a Chilean scheme suggesting that compensation for a Pacific port should take the form of water from the Bolivian altiplano. The Peruvian government was also opposed to the Chilean suggestion that the waters of Lake Titicaca be used to compensate Chile for a Bolivian port. Peru had long considered those waters held in condominium by Bolivia and Peru for their exclusive use. Two decades later, Bolivia and Chile engaged in secret talks in 1971 which were reportedly on the verge of resolving the issue when the Bolivian government was overthrown and negotiations broke down.9 In early 1975, the governments of Bolivia and Chile re-established diplomatic relations, ties which were severed in 1962 when Chile moved unilaterally to divert the headwaters of the Lauca River.10 Bolivia then requested in August 1975 a sovereign coastline at Arica together with a land corridor 50km long by 15km wide further south. Chile responded with a counterproposal in December 1975 in which it offered to exchange a land-sea corridor north of Arica along the Peruvian border extending to the 200 nautical sea limit in return for equivalent territorial compensation in the Bolivian altiplano (Figure 2). While Bolivia initially accepted the concept of equivalent territorial exchange, it later rejected the Chilean proposal Chile offered to exchange a land-sea corridor north of Arica along the Peruvian border for equivalent territorial compensation in the Bolivian altiplano. Articles Section 95 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Figure 3 arguing that it should not have to make territorial concessions to obtain land seized in an aggressive war.11 When Peru learned from Chile, through the formal consultations called for in the 1929 agreements, that the Bolivia-Chile talks centred on territory that was once Peruvian, the Peruvian government prepared a counterproposal in November 1976 which introduced a new tripartite formula and effectively undercut the Chilean initiative. Peru proposed creation of a zone of joint Bolivia-Chile-Peru sovereignty between the city of Arica and the Peruvian border with Bolivia receiving a corridor feeding into this zone.12 Offering Bolivia as much as the Chilean proposal, the Peruvian initiative also reintroduced the issue of Peruvian rights in the disputed zone. Calling for trilateral economic development of the territory, the Peruvian approach reflected a renewed emphasis by the Francisco Morales Bermúdez administration on Andean cooperation and integration (Figure 3).13 The Peruvian initiative contributed to the failure of this round of negotiations as the Chilean government immediately rejected it on the grounds the proposal introduced issues unrelated to the question at hand, infringed on Chilean sovereignty, and threatened modifications to the 1929 treaty.14 In the closing days of 1976, both Chile and Peru reaffirmed their commitment to a satisfactory arrangement for Bolivia with each side blaming the other for the stalemate in negotiations. Eventually, Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez served formal notice of the impasse on Christmas day 1976 when he rejected in principle Chilean demands for territorial compensation as well as the Peruvian proposal for trilateral occupation. Even though little real progress towards resolving outstanding issues was made in this round of talks, they were noteworthy because in them Bolivia received formal recognition from both Chile and Peru of its right to coastal territory although the content of their most recent proposals varied widely. After another 96 Articles Section IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © frustrating year of unproductive attempts to reach a settlement, the Bolivian government again broke diplomatic relations with Chile in March 1978.15 In the latter half of the 1980s, the Peruvian government of Alan García Pérez explored the issue in conjunction with regional diplomatic initiatives intended to improve relations with Peru's neighbours. Soon after the García administration took office, the Foreign Minister of Peru travelled to La Paz where discussions centred on improved commercial relations together with joint efforts to control the illicit narcotics trade known as narcotráfico throughout Latin America. Peruvian representatives at the time acknowledged Bolivia's ongoing concern for sovereign access to the sea but emphasised that it was largely a bilateral issue between Bolivia and Chile. The Bolivian government in the same time frame also moved away from the largely multilateral strategy it had been pursuing for decades and in the direction of a bilateral solution. For example, Bolivia at one point offered to buy outright from Chile a ten-mile strip of territory north of Arica along the Peruvian frontier, an approach which met with no enthusiasm in Santiago. Peruvian President García later appeared to reverse long-standing Peruvian policy when he indicated to his Bolivian counterpart that the Peruvian government was prepared to accept Chilean cession to Bolivia of land occupied by Chile after the War of the Pacific. However, the Bolivian government of Jaime Paz Zamora was unable to take advantage of this app.arent policy shift before Alberto Fujimori replaced García as president of Peru in the summer of 1990.16 The governments of Bolivia and Peru later negotiated a 50-year renewable agreement in early 1992 which permitted Bolivia to establish shipping and customs operations in a duty-free zone and industrial park in the Peruvian port of Ilo, approximately 1,260km south of Lima and 460km west of La Paz. Peru also ceded to Bolivia in the agreement a tourist zone for 99 years, together with 5km of Ilo coastline. The Bolivians immediately baptised the coastal strip ‘Bolivia Mar’. In return, Bolivia ceded similar facilities to Peru at Puerto Suarez on the Paraguay River at the border with Brazil as a site to promote Peruvian trade with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. While the signatories to the agreement both hailed it as an historic step which would greatly facilitate regional development, the Bolivian government emphasised that the pact with Peru marked only the first step in its determination to recover its full rights to the sea. The Peruvian government sounded a more pragmatic note emphasising the need to respect existing international agreements while seeking creative solutions to difficult problems.17 Even as Peru negotiated with Bolivia, it continued its dialogue with Chile aimed at full implementation of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol. Talks here focused on three separate but related articles in the 1929 agreements. To summarise, Article 5 of the treaty called for Chile to construct at Arica for Peru a wharf, customs office, and a terminal station for the Tacna-Arica railway. Article 7 of the treaty called for Chile and Peru to respect private rights legally acquired in the territories remaining under their respective sovereignties, including the right of Peru to the Tacna-Arica Railway Company. Article 2 of the additional protocol called for Peru to enjoy complete freedom of transit for persons, merchandise, and armaments to and from Peruvian territory once the port facilities called for in Article 5 had been constructed. Although Chile had agreed in a convention negotiated in the mid-1980s to turn over a dock in Arica it had constructed for Peru, as well as granting to Peru the right to use the Tacna-Arica railway, the question of complete freedom of transit on the railway to the pier remained contentious. Peruvian authorities at the outset of President Fujimori's first term continued to argue that the terms of the 1929 agreements had still not been honoured in full.18 Formal negotiations with Chile opened in early 1993 and initially appeared fruitful. Representatives of Chile and Peru concluded an agreement in May 1993, often BILATERAL TALKS The Bolivian government also moved away from the largely multilateral strategy it had been pursuing for decades and in the direction of a bilateral solution. Articles Section 97 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © referred to as the Lima Conventions, which seemed to resolve the final disagreements affecting full implementation of the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol. Unfortunately, appearances once again proved deceptive. Less than two years later, Peruvian Foreign Minister Francisco Tudela and his Chilean counterpart, José María Insulza, announced that the 1993 Lima Conventions were being set aside since they were no longer appropriate to negotiations between Chile and Peru. Instead, the parties agreed to seek what was described as a "practical and concrete formula" related to the facilities provided for in the 1929 agreements. Over the next four years, little progress was made on this issue as Peru was preoccupied with its border dispute with Ecuador; however, observers agreed that full implementation of the terms of the 1929 agreements remained high on the foreign policy agendas of both Chile and Peru.19 The governments of Ecuador and Peru, on 28 October 1998, concluded a Global and Definitive Peace Agreement that ended the longest standing boundary dispute in the Americas.20 In the wake of the successful conclusion of this emotionally charged, highly involved dispute, the Peruvian government announced its desire to resolve with Chile all outstanding issues relating to the 1929 treaty and additional protocol. Following almost a year of often tough negotiations, Foreign Ministers Fernando de Trazegnies of Peru and Juan Gabriel Valdés of Chile, in the ornate Salón Dorado de Palacio de Gobierno in Lima, signed on 13 November 1999 a package of documents which collectively executed the 1929 treaty and additional protocol and ended 70 years of controversy. At the same time, Chile returned to Peru some 200 books and documents, mostly pertaining to the city of Tacna, which had been taken to Chile at the end of the War of the Pacific.21 The Act of Execution (Acta de Ejecución) specifically addressed the requirement in Article 5 of the 1929 treaty for Chile to construct for Peru a wharf, customs office, and a railway terminal station at Arica as well as the requirement in Article 2 of the additional protocol which called for absolute free transit of persons, merchandise, and armaments to and from Peruvian territory. Additionally, it recognised the right of servitude, as detailed in Article 5 of the treaty, including its application to the Arica and Tacna Railway Company where it crosses Chilean territory. Finally, the executing act detailed the Peruvian administrative bodies with future authority in Arica, specifically the Empresa Nacional de Puertos S.A. (ENAPU) for the port, the Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (ENAFER) for the railway, and the Aduana del Perú for customs. The Regulation of the Act of Execution (Reglamento del Acta de Ejecución) provided additional details at the operative level of the agreement. The Interinstitutional Act (Acuerdo Interinstitucional sobre Solución de Controversias), in turn, addressed potential areas of future conflict or controversy in the administration of the total agreement (Figure 4). The resolution of the outstanding issues related to the 1929 treaty and additional protocol was generally well received in both Chile and Peru. The most obvious exception was a determined group of patriots, mostly resident in and around the Peruvian city of Tacna, who argued that the details of the settlement were unfavourable to Peru. Concern was also expressed that the agreement did not include provision for investment in the frontier region with Chile similar to the US$3 billion investment package which was an integral part of the 1998 Ecuador-Peru boundary settlement. Peruvian flags in Tacna, many adorned with black ribbons, flew at halfmast for days and the Pan-American highway from Tacna to Arica was blocked in protest for a short period of time. Criticism in Chile was centred in Arica where residents were worried that the agreements would result in Bolivian cargo being diverted to the Peruvian wharf and thus have a negative economic impact on Chilean facilities. The Bolivian government, on the other hand, congratulated Chile and Peru for concluding the executing act while at the same time expressing the hope that attention could now turn towards satisfying Bolivian desires for a sovereign exit to END GAME A Global and Definitive Peace Agreement that ended the longest standing boundary dispute in the Americas. 98 Articles Section IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Figure 4 The Promenade PPaaccii ff iicc OOcceeaann AARR II CCAA N the Pacific Ocean. Less than three weeks later, President Alberto Fujimori completed the first official state visit of a Peruvian president to Chile. Chilean President Eduardo Frei later visited Peru in early February 2000.22 The dispute between Bolivia, Chile, and Peru for control of the Atacama Desert has changed considerably in character and content since its inception almost two centuries ago. In the beginning, it was largely a boundary dispute not unlike the myriad of other such issues pending throughout Latin America. The character of the dispute began to change after 1842 when the discovery of guano, sodium nitrate, and other minerals in the disputed zone raised serious issues of economic development as well as regional hegemony. In the aftermath of the War of the Pacific, a victorious Chile sought to consolidate its position in the region while Bolivia and Peru hoped to regain both lost territories and national honour. Once Chile concluded peace treaties with Peru in 1883 and Bolivia in 1904, regional and international trade and other economic concerns often took a secondary position to geopolitical considerations in the region. The dispute was tripartite in nature from the beginning and remained so for most of its long history. For Bolivia, any acceptable alternative to its Pacific port at Cobija naturally involved, after 1842, the interests and rights of Chile and Peru. Once Bolivia had declared war on Chile in 1879, Peru was honour bound under the terms of an 1873 treaty of defensive alliance to join the conflict on the side of Bolivia. After conclusion of the 1883 Treaty of Ancón, it took Chile and Peru more than four decades to reach a final settlement. When they did, the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol again mirrored the tripartite nature of the dispute in that the additional protocol stipulated that neither Chile nor Peru could cede territory obtained in the treaty to a third state without the permission of the other signatory. OBSERVATIONS The dispute was tripartite in nature from the beginning and remained so for most of its long history. Articles Section 99 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Over the next 70 years, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru engaged in numerous bilateral and trilateral negotiations.23 The most positive result to date is the package of agreements concluded by Chile and Peru in December 1999 which executes the unfulfilled clauses of the 1929 Tacna and Arica Treaty and Additional Protocol. The 1999 agreements appear to be a good result for Chile and Peru; unfortunately, they do not address the aspirations of Bolivia which continues to demand a Pacific port. In this regard, the challenge and opportunity of the recent pacts between Chile and Peru is to make them the genesis of a new spirit of negotiation and compromise which also takes into full account the legitimate interests of Bolivia. Until a trinational accord or alternative solution fully satisfactory to the governments of Bolivia, Chile, and Peru is reached, it is difficult to envisage a future diplomatic or economic process which truly maximises sub-regional cooperation and development. Notes 1 For a detailed discussion of the origins of the dispute see St John, R. B. (1994) The Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute in the Atacama Desert, Boundary and Territory Briefing 1, 6, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit: 1-12. 2 Bonilla, H. (1994) Guano y Burguesía en el Perú, 3rd ed., Quito: Flacso-Sede Ecuador: 127-167; Jarama, A. (1998) ‘El Perú y la cuestión portuaria boliviana en el siglo XIX: Factores de inestabilidad’, Política Internacional (julio/setiembre): 127- 129. 3 Copies of the Treaty of Ancón and its Supplementary Protocol can be found in Peru, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (1936) Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos vigentes entre el Perú y otros estados I, Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre: 165-168. 4 Dennis, W. J. (1931) Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru Boundary Dispute and of the Arbitrations by the United States, New Haven: Yale University Press: 194-226; Palacios Rodríguez, R. (1974) La Chilenización de Tacna y Arica, 1883-1929, Lima: Editorial Arica S. A.; Yepes del Castillo, Ernesto (1999) "Un plebiscito imposible..." Tacna-Arica, 1925-1926, Lima: Ediciones Análisis. 5 For a copy of the 1884 truce agreement see Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Colonización (1884) Memoria al congreso nacional de 1884, Santiago: n.p.: xxivxxviii. 6 Encina, F. A. (1963) Las relaciones entre Chile y Bolivia (1841-1963), Santiago: Editorial Nascimento: 18-21. For a copy of the 1904 treaty see Dennis, W. J. (1927) Documentary History of the Tacna-Arica Dispute, Iowa City: University Press: 232- 234. 7 For a copy of the 1929 treaty and additional protocol see Peru (1936) Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos: 183-187. An English language translation of the treaty and additional protocol can be found in Dennis (1931) Tacna and Arica: 316-320. On the Tacna-Arica Railway Company see Contrato de Construcción y Explotación del Ferrocarril de Arica a la Ciudad de Tacna Celebrado entre el Gobierno Peruano y Don José Hegan (1852) mimeograph. 8 St John (1994) Bolivia-Chile-Peru Dispute: 19; Gumucio Granier, J. (1997) ‘Alberto Ostria y el Pacto con el Perú de 1936’, Agenda Internacional IV, 9 (julio-diciembre): 97-106. 9 Fernando Guachalla, L. (1976) La cuestión portuaria y las negociaciones de 1950, La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 34-104; Fellmann Velarde, J. (1967) Memorandum sobre política exterior boliviana, 2d ed., La Paz: Librería Editorial Juventud: 81-121 and 146-148; Gumucio Granier, J. (1985) Estados Unidos y el Mar Boliviano: Testimonios para la historia, New York: n.p.: 537-541. 10 Gordon, D. R. (1979) ‘The Question of the Pacific: Current Perspectives on a Long- Standing Dispute’, World Affairs 141, 4 (Spring): 324-325. For a detailed analysis of the so-called Charaña negotiations which opened in 1975 see Gumucio Granier, J. (1999) Charaña: Negociación Marítima, 1975-1978, mimeograph, especially Chapter 5. 11 Gorman, S. M. (1981) ‘Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and Economic Initiatives’, in Ferris, E. G. and Lincoln, J. K. (eds.) Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, Boulder: Westview Press: 122- 123; Pittman, H. T. (1984) ‘Chilean Foreign Policy: The Pragmatic Pursuit of Dr Ronald Bruce St John is an independent scholar specialising in the political economy and foreign policy of developing states. He first visited Bolivia, Chile and Peru in 1968 and has been a regular commentator on Andean affairs since that time. 100 Articles Section IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2000 © Geopolitical Goals’, in Lincoln, J. K. and Ferris, E. G. (eds.) The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies: Challenges for the 1980's, Boulder and London: Westview Press: 133; Shumavon, D. H. (1981) ‘Bolivia: Salida al Mar’, in Ferris, E. G. and Lincoln, J. K. (eds.) Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, Boulder: Westview Press: 184-186. 12 Lagos Carmona, G. (1981) Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: Los tratados de límites con Bolivia, 2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello: 130-131; De la Puente Radbill, J. (1989) ‘La mediterraneidad de Bolivia’, in Ferrero Costa, E. (ed.) Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales: 45-53. 13 St John, R. B. (1992) Boundaries, Trade and Seaports: Power Politics in the Atacama Desert, Program in Latin American Studies Occasional Paper Series, No. 28, University of Massachusetts at Amherst: 28. 14 Escobari Cusicanqui, J. (1982) Historia diplomática de Bolivia, II, Lima: Talleres de Industrial Gráfica, S. A.: 39-53; Lagos Carmona, G. (1981) Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: Los tratados de límites con Bolivia, 2d ed., Santiago: Editorial AndrésBello: 126-132; Montenegro, W. (1987) Oportunidades Perdidas: Bolivia y el Mar, La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 69-136. 15 Botelho Gosalvez, R. (1980) El litoral Boliviano: perspectiva histórica y geopolítica, Buenos Aires: El Cid Editor: 143-144; Lagos Carmona, Historia de las Fronteras de Chile: 132; Morales, W. Q. (1992) Bolivia: Land of Struggle, Boulder: Westview Press: 177-178. 16 República de Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (1988) Tricolor: Historia y Proyecciones de Paz, Desarrollo e Integración del Diferendo Marítimo Boliviano-Chileno, La Paz and Cochabamba: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro: 95-157; Morales (1992) Bolivia: 179; Ferrero Costa, E. (1987) ‘Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current Trends, Constraints and Opportunities’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29, 2 (Summer): 63-66. 17 St John, R. B. (1994) ‘Stalemate in the Atacama’, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 2, 1 (April): 66-67. 18 St John, R. B. (1999) La Política Exterior del Perú, Lima: Asociación de Funcionarios del Servicio Diplomático del Perú: 220-221; Mercado Jarrín, E. (1988) ‘Las relaciones actuales del Perú con Chile y Bolivia: Algunas reflexiones’, in Eduardo Ferrero Costa (ed.) Relaciones del Perú con los paises vecinos, Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales: 150-153; Brousset Barrios, J. (1989) ‘Ejecución de las cláusulas pendientes del Tratado de 1929’, in Eduardo Ferrero Costa (ed.) Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia, Lima: Centro de Estudios Internacionales: 97-109. 19 Tudela, F. (1998-1999) ‘Entrevista a Francisco Tudela’, Debate XX, 104 (diciembre - enero):15-16; ‘Chile dice que no se cambiarán términos de la Convención de Lima’, El Comercio (Lima), February 13, 1995; 'Lima Conventions Set Aside', IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 4, 2 (Summer 1996): 54-55; St John, ‘Stalemate in the Atacama’, 67-68. 20 For a detailed discussion of the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute see St John, R. B. (1999) The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to Settlement, Boundary and Territory Briefing, 3, 1, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit. 21 Acta de Ejecución (13 November 1999), Reglamento del Acto de Ejecución (13 November 1999), Acuerdo Interinstitucional sobre Solución de Controversias (13 November 1999), mimeograph copies. Peruvian Foreign Minister Fernando de Trazegnies, a dedicated bibliophile, took real satisfaction in the return of this cache of historical materials to Peru. 22 Deustua C., A. (1999) ‘Amaos Los Unos y los Rotos’, Caretas 1595 (25 de Noviembre); El Comercio (Lima) 13 November 1999 and 14 November 1999; La República (Lima) 14 November 1999 and 24 November 1999; El Diario (La Paz) 12 November 1999 and 13 November 1999; El Mercurio (Santiago) 12 November 1999. 23 For a recent discussion of alternative solutions to the dispute see Barrios, R. (ed.) (1997) Bolivia, Chile Y Perú: Una opción cooperativa, La Paz: Unidad de Análisis de Política Exterior, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.