Lima reaction to the news that the government was considering buying Repsol was impressive. No opposition but only generated hysteria. A crowd of politicians and pundits came to tell us that Ollanta Humala, against all logic had become Chavez. They insisted that Humala (finally!) had removed his disguise, and was going to leave the road moderated by statism and a probable dictatorship. Alan Garcia spoke of a "maneuver Chavez". CONFIEP president predicted the "beginning of the transformation of Peru with a state overwhelming, arrogant, authoritarian, as in Cuba". Even some columnists who remained calm during the hysteria of 2011 lost in Repsol, wondering what if "Ollanta Humala decides to be, really, Ollanta Humala" and speculating about the possibility of a coup. The collective tantrum worked. Humala's proposal was buried. As Francisco Durand wrote, "I have not seen a show of force so brutal." Whence come these collective tantrums? I do not think they are orchestrated by the media or some business. They are quite spontaneous. They can be started by a handful of businessmen and journalists, but they echo much of Lima society. The Washington Consensus in Latin America lost power in 2000, but still a Consensus of Lima, and is stronger than ever. A large part of Lima's elite-and fervently adheres to ultra-liberal economic model. There is a fundamentalism level not seen elsewhere. Even in the most liberal economies in the region (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay) are discussed measures of state intervention (industrial promotion, regulation of foreign capital, redistributive policies) that are in Lima heresy. This allergy to government intervention is not limited to the right: it extends to the center and to the center-left (most of the columnists of The Republic opposed the purchase of Repsol!). And not limited to the elite: the Lima Consensus covers almost the entire middle class Lima and a significant part of the popular sectors. As he writes Carlos Melendez, the breadth of consensus is probably due to the deep crisis of the state (and statism) of 1980-and the extraordinary economic resurrection (under the liberal model) of 2000. Lima Consensus is powerful. It exercises almost veto power over economic policy. Since the fall of Fujimori, no government has challenged the Lima Consensus or attempted to rule against it. Alan Garcia completely forget their past social democratic and conservative orthodoxy embraced with fervor. None of Lula or Bachelet: ruled with Pinochet's economic policies. Humala defeated by the Consensus of Lima in 2006 and badly beaten for it in the first round of 2011, he adapted well. When he wanted to form a cabinet of center or center-left (mostly ex Toledista), collided with the Lima Consensus and ended choosing a cabinet composed of people who had voted for Keiko. For two years, every trace of unorthodox step has provoked a hysterical reaction from the political elite, economic, and media. As he writes Carlos Melendez, Humala has been "caught by the autopilot installed in the early 1990.Existen veto powers many pro system, that any deviation is rectified government with public roche or not." For the economic right, the Lima Consensus is the "guarantor" of continuity more effective, more effective than the 1993 Constitution, legislative and judicial powers, and Vargas Llosa. But it also costs, especially in terms of democratic representation. Lima Consensus does not represent a majority of the Peruvian electorate. In fact, in the last three elections, candidates who best represented the Lima Consensus (Flores in 2001 and 2006 and PPK in 2011) did not even reach the second round. Those who won-Toledo, Garcia and Humala did a program or center-left center that promised a moderate change. However, by not hitting the Lima Consensus, the three turned right, opting for more continuity and less change. Is that wrong? In democratic terms, yes. Those who criticize Humala for "betraying" his program when he speaks of a "balance" between the state and the market confused (or want to confuse) Humala program PPK program. The liberal center was a key part of the coalition Humala in the second round, but it was not the only one. Bigger was the sector that was with Humala in the first round: the nearly five million Peruvians who voted for the Great Transformation. As president, Humala has sought a balance between the two partners in his coalition. But sometimes the Lima Consensus does not. Many times, when Humala makes an effort to represent its original base, generates a collective tantrum in Lima and the government back. The economic liberals celebrate, but what remains of democratic representation? There is no consensus of Peru. Outside Lima, there is more skepticism about the economic model. The electorate is less liberal and statist. What if the Lima Consensus imposes too-if, like a spoiled child, Lima's elite is not willing to compromise on anything, and is demanding that Humala adhere to PPK-program? If the perception grows that a minority Lima is undermining the popular will expressed at the polls (Humala won, not PPK), could give rise to a "anti-Lima Consensus" on the inside? Side note: The Repsol case also demonstrates the fragility of the Coalition Paniagüista. When it comes to playing the economic model, the Coalition Paniagüista as a meringue melts in the mouth Lima (and the only paniagüista remains is a lone Harvard political scientist). As noted by several of my critics, the Coalition is Paniagüista Lima Consensus daughter. Depends on it. It only works until you touch the model
No comments:
Post a Comment